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This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal
form a `canonical' game in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the
former one. The operation dened this way respects the restriction of games
to subgames and yields a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover,
by the above requirements the `canonical extensive game form' is uniquely
de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0 Introduction
This paper represents the second part of a study devoted to the relationship between a
strategic game (game form) and its possible representations by extensive games (game
forms). To be explicit, a representation of a strategic game G is an extensive game   the
`normal', `strategic' or `von Neumann-Morgenstern form' of which is G.
The aim of this paper is to exhibit the choice of a method to represent strategic games
by extensive games in a way that essentially preserves all symmetries of the strategic
game but in addition satises additional axioms. These axioms concern robustness under
restriction and minimality of the tree involved. Eventually, we want these axioms to
characterize the representation and this is the main theorem of this paper (i.e., Theorem
6.6).
We should emphasize that our starting point is a game in strategic form. The transition
from the extensive form to the strategic form as dened by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [5] has already been investigated extensively (see Kohlberg and Mertens [3] for
a recent treatment of this topic). The transition in the opposite direction is considered
`trivial' and conceptually straightforward. It is the purpose of our work to show that this
is not true: The choice of a representation of strategic games by extensive games which
respects symmetries of strategic games leads to dicult conceptual problems and deep
mathematical results.
The previous results obtained (see [6]) and the drive of the present continuation can at best
be explained by pointing to the `Battle of the Sexes'. Some of the problems motivating
our treatment are explained at best within the context of this example.
















Here C is interpreted as `attending a concert' and S is `mingling with the crowds at a
soccer game'. There are two `focal' equilibria in this game: (C,C) and (S,S). Myerson
discusses these games nicely in [4], Section 3.5.
There is a standard convention in Game Theory according to which two simple versions
of a representation for this game by an extensive game are exhibited (see Figure 0.1).
The above convention which leads to multiple representations has the following two prob-
lematic aspects.
(1) The transition to the extensive form might in
uence focality. Consider the extensive
game  1. It is common knowledge in this game that player 1 moves rst. Therefore? Introduction ? 3
Figure 0.1: Two representations
she has the option to choose C before player two makes his choice. Thus, it seems
to us that in  1 the pair (C;C) of strategies is more likely to be played than (S;S):
Our feeling is supported by the experimental work of Rapoport [7]. Clearly, in  2
the pair (S;S) may be the dominant focal equilibrium rather than (C;C):
(2) The transition to the extensive form may destroy symmetry. The game G is `sym-
metric' in the following sense: It has an automorphism which permutes players 1
and 2 (for a denition of automorphism, i.e. an isomorphism of G to itself, see
Harsanyi and Selten [2], Section 3.4). This automorphism is given explicitly in
Example 4.6 (1) of [6]. However,  1 and  2 are totally asymmetric; more precisely,
if   =  1 or   =  2, then there is no non-trivial automorphism of   that respects
the temporal ordering of moves in  .
The discussion in the last paragraph leads naturally to the following basic question:
Let G be a game in strategic form. When is G `symmetric'? (In particular, is the Battle
of Sexes a symmetric game?)
Quite surprisingly there was no satisfactory answer available to this question. If we follow
our mathematical intuition and dene a strategic game G to be symmetric if all possible
joint renamings of players and strategies are automorphisms of G (see Harsanyi and
Selten [2], p. 71, for the precise denition of renaming), then the class of symmetric
games reduces to the trivial class of all games whose payo functions are constant and
equal. Also, this denition is incompatible with the denition of symmetric bimatrix
games (see van Damme [1], p.211).
In [6] we presented an answer to this basic question. A symmetry of G, according to
the denition given in [6], is a permutation  of the players for which there exists an
automorphism  = (;') of G (here ' is a renaming of strategies which is compatible
with ). Thus, our denition of symmetries (of strategic games) is dierent from that
of Harsanyi and Selten [2], p. 73. The game G is symmetric if every permutation of
the players is a symmetry of G. Thus, in particular, the Battle of Sexes is symmetric
according to our denition. Our denition has the following desirable properties.
(1) The class of symmetric games is a nontrivial interesting class.4 ? Section 0 ?
(2) It is possible to use similar ideas to dene symmetries of extensive games (see
Denition 1.14).
(3) It is possible to compare the symmetry groups of a strategic game and its coalitional
form (see Theorem 4.11 of [6]).
As far as we could check, symmetries of games in extensive form which preserve the partial
ordering on the nodes that is induced by the game tree were not considered previously.
Thus, the treatment of symmetry groups of extensive games, as oered in [6], was entirely
new.
We now present the solution to the problem of representing the Battle of Sexes by an
extensive game.
Figure 0.2: The `canonical' Battle of Sexes
A symmetry of a (strategic) game G, according to our denition, as presented in [6] (see
Denition 1.13), is a permutation  of the players for which there exists a renaming '
of strategies which is compatible with  such that  = (;') is an automorphism of G.
The game G is symmetric if every permutation of the players is a symmetry of G. Similar
denitions have been oered for extensive games and this way it is seen that Figure 0.2
indeed shows a symmetric representation of a symmetric game.
However, it is by no means true that it is the only such symmetric representation.
As a further property it can be seen easily that Figure 0.2 indicates a graph `minimal' in
the class of all representations (of the Battle of Sexes) which preserve the symmetries.
It is our aim within this paper to generalize the foregoing construction to all nite strategic
games and to show that that there is a `canonical' way of representing a strategic game
by a symmetry preserving and minimal extensive game. By various reasons we speak of
games and game forms simultaneously within this context.
Clearly some further diculties appear at once. Let us list two of them which appear to
be quite diametral.
(1) For example, a 2  3 two-person game has no symmetries. Therefore, a `canonical'
representation for such a game should have suitable properties of a more general? Introduction ? 5
character. If we add the requirement that our representations of 2  3 games are
consistent with our representations of 22 games, then we have an additional tool
(and an additional obstacle) to be concerned with.
(2) On the other hand, given a `square' n-person strategic game form (i.e. all players
having the same number of strategies), it is not clear how to nd for it a minimal
and symmetry preserving representation since square game forms in principle allow
for complete symmetry between the players.
Other than in the example above, when the number of players is greater than two,
then there is no obvious solution to the problem of representing square game forms.
For this purpose it is necessary to rst dene the simplest (`atomic') representations
of square game forms and then build `symmetrizations' of such `atoms' in order to
obtain symmetry-preserving representations.
Based on these procedures we eventually come up with a general canonical method of
representing strategic games (game forms) by extensive games (game forms): We ax-
iomatically justify a certain symmetrization of atoms (the one which in every branch
exhibits a clear `time structure' or `order of play') to be the unique representation which
preserves symmetries, respects restrictions and shows a minimal tree.
We now shortly review the contents of the paper. The versions of strategic and extensive
game forms and games we are dealing with have been introduced in [6]. We will, however,
shortly repeat the denitions in order to make this work self contained. The same is true
for the basic notions of isomorphisms between games and game forms.
One of the major aspects of [6] is an alternative denition of symmetry deviating from
the one given by previous authors. Actually a symmetry is a residual class of automor-
phisms of game forms (games), the elements of which dier by an impersonal motion
(automorphism) only. Hence the content of Section 1 is a short review of the necessary
denitions.
Section 2 is devoted to the denition of faithful representations. An extensive game form 

is a representation of a game form g if for every choice of a vector u of payo functions the
normal form of the extensive game  (
;u) is (impersonally) isomorphic to the strategic
game G(g;u). A representation 
 of a game form g is faithful if, for every choice of
a vector of payo functions u, the games  (
;u) and G(g;u) have the same symmetry
group. Theorem 2.5 shows that the outcome function of a representation does not depend
on chance moves.
Within Section 3 we set out to construct and characterize faithful representations of gen-
eral and square game forms. The main result of this section is presented in Corollary
3.6. The group of automorphisms of a square game form is the surjective image of the
corresponding group of any extensive game form representing it, if and only if the repre-
sentation is faithful.
In Section 4 we consider the minimal representations of square and general game forms
which are called atoms.6 ? Section 1 ?
In Section 5 it is rst of all shown (Theorem 5.4) that symmetrizations of atoms are
faithful representations of strategic game forms that are square and general. The main
result of this section, Theorem 5.7, proves a converse result: A minimal and faithful
representation of a general and square strategic game form must be a symmetrization of
an atom.
An atom is time structured if the order of play is the same for all n-tupels of strategies.
Section 6 is devoted to the proof that symmetrizations of time structured atoms yield
canonical representations of nite strategic games. First, Theorem 6.5 shows that minimal
and faithful representations of square and general strategic game forms must be time-
structured (provided the number of strategies is at least three).
A representation (in the sense of Theorem 6.6) is a mapping which assigns to every
game form (in the domain of the mapping), an extensive game form that represents it.
A representation is canonical if it is faithful, respects isomorphisms, is consistent with
restriction, and has a minimality property.
Theorem 6.6, the main result of this work, proves that there exists a unique canonical
representation of strategic games which is given by (generalized) time structured repre-
sentations.
1 Prerequisits
The structure presenting the fundamental strata of our considerations is the one of a game
tree. Since it is not unfamiliar in Game Theory we describe it mainly verbally, however
the details are exactly the ones presented in [6].
A game tree is a set of data (E;;P;Q;C;p) the elements of which are described as
follows.
E is a nite set (the nodes) and  is a binary relation on E such that (E;) is a tree
(the root is x0; the generic element (node) is ; and the set of endpoints is @E):
The rank function r dened on the nodes counts the number of steps from the
nodes to the root, e.g. r(x0) = 0: The set f j r() = tg =: L(E;;t) constitutes
the level t and R(E;) :=
P
2@E r() denotes the total rank of the tree. A path
is a sequence of consecutive nodes. A play is any path that connects the root with
an endpoint.
P is a partition of E   @E, the player partition. There is a distinguished element
P0 2 P (which may be the empty set) representing the chance moves. All other
player sets are assumed to be nonvoid. The elements of P represent sets of nodes
at which a certain player is in command of the next move.
Q represents the information partition. Q is a renement of P; thus an element
Q 2 Q; Q  P; is an information set of the player who commands the elements of? Prerequisits ? 7
P: In particular it is required that Q renes P0 to singletons.
C is a family of partitions representing choices. To explain this object, let
C() := f
0 j   
0g





Now we assume that for any Q 2 Q we are given a partition C(Q) of C(Q) such
that
S 2 C(Q) =) jS \ C()j = 1 ( 2 Q)
holds true. then the system of choices is described by C := (C(Q))Q2Q.
p = (p)2P0 is a family of probability distributions (of chance moves), i.e., p is a
probability on the successors of  for every  2 P0. We assume that p(0) is positive
for every successor 0 of . Intuitively, chance determines the successor of  2 P0
according to the random mechanism described by p:
We are now in the position to discuss preforms. Extensive preforms are obtained by
assigning the names of the players to the corresponding elements of the player partition
of a game tree, more precisely:
Denition 1.1. An extensive preform is a tuple
 = (N;E;;P;Q;C;p;) (1.1)
where N is a nite set (the set of players) of at least two elements, the next ve data
constitute a game tree, and  : P   fP0g ! N is a bijective mapping.
Intuitively,  assings the nodes of P 2 P   fP0g to the player (P) 2 N, who is thought
to be in charge of choosing a successor when this node occurs during a play. We use the
notation  1(i) = Pi to refer to `the nodes of player i'.
In order to describe a strategic preform we need much less preliminary framework.
Denition 1.2. A strategic preform is a pair e = (N;S), where N is a nite set (the
set of players, jNj  2) and S =
Q
i2N Si is the product of nite sets Si 6= ; (i 2 N)
(the strategy sets).
Game forms are now obtained by assigning outcomes to the choice of a play or to a strat-
egy prole respectively. In fact, a strategy prole in the strategic context can frequently
be identied with an outcome (the `general' case). However, it is more appropriate to
choose an abstract set of outcomes and assign its elements to plays or proles accordingly.8 ? Section 1 ?
Figure 1.3: An extensive preform
Denition 1.3. (1) An extensive game form is a tuple

 = (;A;) = (N;E;;P;Q;C;p;;A;): (1.2)
Here,  is an extensive preform and A is a nite set (the outcomes) while  : @E !
A is a surjective mapping called outcome function, which assigns outcomes to
endpoints of the graph (E;).
(2) A strategic game form is a quadruple g = (e;A;h) = (N;S;A;h): Here e is
a preform, A a nite set and h : S ! A is a surjective mapping again called the
outcome function. If h is a bijection, then g is called general.
Figure 1.4: An extensive game form
The term `general' is not suitable for extensive game forms as (unless in a special case)
it is frequently to be expected that dierent plays in
uenced by a chance move result in
the same outcome.
We now turn to the notion of (extensive and strategic) games. In a game we have payos
in terms of utilities, i.e., real valued functions. Eventually, this includes also the possibility
of computing expectations when the chance in
uence is taken into account.
Denition 1.4. (1) An extensive game is a tuple
  = (;) = (N;E;;P;Q;C;p;;) (1.3)? Prerequisits ? 9
such that
 = (i)i2N : @E ! I R
N (1.4)
represents the system of player's utility functions depending on endpoints of the
graph (E;):
(2) A strategic game is a tuple
G = (e;u) = (N;S;u) (1.5)
Again,
u = (ui)i2N : S ! I R
N (1.6)
constitutes the player's utility functions dened on strategy proles.
Remark 1.5. Obviously, games can be generated from game forms by means of a utility
dened on the alphabet. Formally, if 
 and g are (extensive and strategic) game forms
and
U : A ! I R
N
is a (`utility') function dened on outcomes, then
 := U  ; u := U  h (1.7)
induce games
  := U  
 := U  (;A;) = (;U  ) (1.8)
and
G := U  g := U  (e;A;h) = (e;U  h): (1.9)
Next we shortly review the basic ideas of isomorphisms, motions, and symmetries as
presented in [6].
Isomorphisms for strategic objects are comparably easy to understand, therefore we start
with this notion.
Given strategic preforms e = (N;S) and e0 = (N;S0) we consider bijective mappings
 : N ! N and 'i : Si ! S0
(i) (i 2 N).  renames the players and 'i maps strategies of
player i into strategies of his double.
The pair (;') of course induces a simultaneous reshuing of strategies, i.e., a mapping
'
 : S ! S
0; ('
(s))(i) := 'i(si) (i 2 N): (1.10)
Denition 1.6. An isomorphism between strategic preforms e and e0 is a family (;')
of bijective mappings
 : N ! N; 'i : Si ! S
0
(i) (i 2 N)
such that
(;')e = (;')(N;S) := (N;'
(S)) = (N;S
0) (1.11)
holds true.10 ? Section 1 ?
As to extensive objects, the denition of isomorphisms requires more eort. We start out
with game trees. Consider a bijective mapping  which maps the nodes of a game tree
onto the nodes of another game tree. It is not dicult to imagine what it means that
 respects the structures of the trees, i.e., the successor relation and the partitions - or
else consult [6]. We then quote
Denition 1.7. A game tree (E;;P;Q;C;p) is isomorphic to a game tree
(E0;0 ;P0;Q0;C0;p0) if there is a bijective mapping  : E  ! E0 (an isomorphism
between the game trees) which satises the following properties.
(1) The mapping  respects (;0), (P;P0), and (Q;Q0).
(2) (P0) = P 0
0 and p0()((0)) = p(0) holds true for  2 P0 and 0 2 C().
(3) For Q 2 Q the mapping  respects (C(Q);C0(Q0)), where Q0 2 Q0 is the unique
information set which satises (Q) = Q0.
Note that (2) makes sense in view of (1), the bijectivity of , and the underlying tree
structure. Now turn to extensive preforms. The underlying game trees being isomor-
phically mapped into each other, we also want to adapt the assignment of partitions to
players consistently.
Denition 1.8. Let  = (N;E;;P;Q;C;p;) and 0 = (N;E0;0;P0;Q0;C0;p0;0) be
extensive preforms. A isomorphism between  and 0 is a pair of mappings (;) such
that  is a permutation of N; : E ! E0 with the following properties.
(1)  is an isomorphism between the underlying game trees (cf. Denition 1.7).
(2) ((P)) = 0((P)) (P 2 P)
One can imagine that a pair of bijective mappings (an isomorphism) (;) acts separately
on all the objects constituting an extensive preform. The exact denitions are more or
less canonical and will not be explicitely mentioned. To represent it in a closed form, the
action (;) on  is described as follows:
(;) = (;)(N;E;;P;Q;C;p;)
:= ((N);E;;P;Q;C;p 1;     1)
= (N;E0;0;P0;Q0;C0;p0;0)
(1.12)
Again let us emphasize that isomorphisms respect the ordering of the nodes. This re
ects
the notion of `focality' as discussed in the introductory section.
As to isomorphisms of game forms, our next object of interest is the alphabet of outcomes.
Again we rst demonstrate our goal in the range of strategic territory. Consider the











The alphabet or outcome set being the same in both cases, we feel that F and G are
structurally equal, i.e., isomorphic - nevertheless this cannot be obtained by reshuing
the strategies and/or the players. In addition to the familiar operations we should admit
a bijection of the alphabet; in the above case this would be expressed by a bijection
 : A ! A; a ! c; b ! a; c ! b: This consideration motivates the following denition.
Denition 1.9. Let g = (e;A;h) and g0 = (e0;A0;h0) be strategic game forms. An iso-
morphism of g and g0 is a triple (;';) such that (;') is an isomorphism between e
and e0 while  : A ! A0 is a bijection satisfying
h
0 =   h  ('
)
 1:
Here, ' is the mapping dened in (1.10). That is, we have






An isomorphism is outcome preserving if A = A0 and  is the identity.
Inevitably we have to discuss isomorphisms for the third group of objects under consid-
eration, i.e., for games. The dierence with respect to game forms is constituted by the
presence of utility functions instead of the outcome function. Therefore we have to explain
the kind of action a permutation (renaming) of the players induces on n-tuples of utility
functions, i.e. on u or  respectively.
Clearly, if (;') is an isomorphism between the strategic preforms e and e0 and u and
u0 are tuples of utilities dened on S and S0 respectively, then the utility of i's image




(s)) = ui(s) (i 2 N); (1.13)
thus indicating that we rename players and strategies simultaneously.
This denes the action of the pair (;') on tuples of utility functions via
((;')u)(i)('
(s)) := ui(s): (1.14)
We have thus explained
(;')u : S
0 ! I R
N: (1.15)
Analogously, within the extensive set-up, if we have an isomorphism (;) of preforms
 and 0; cf. Denition 1.8, and if  : @E ! I RN is a utility N-tuple dened on the
endpoints of (E;), the action of (;), i.e.
(;) : @E
0 ! I R
N (1.16)
is given by
((;))(i)(()) := i() ( 2 @E; i 2 N): (1.17)
Thus we have12 ? Section 1 ?
Denition 1.10. (1) Let G = (e;u) and G0 = (e0;u0) be strategic games. An isomor-
phism between G and G0 is a pair (;') such that (;') is an isomorphism between
e and e0 (see Denition 1.6 and (1.11)) and u0
(i)('(s)) = ui(s) (i 2 N;s 2 S):
That is, we have
(;')G = (;')(e;u) = ((;')e;(;')u) = (e
0;u
0) (1.18)
(see (1.14) and (1.15)).
(2) Let   = (;) and  0 = (0;0) be extensive games. An isomorphism between
  and  0 is a pair (;) such that (;) is an isomorphism between  and 0 (see
Denition 1.8) and 0
(i)(()) = i() ( 2 @E;i 2 N). That is, we write
(;)  = (;)(;) = ((;);(;)) = (
0;
0) (1.19)
(see (1.16) and (1.17)).
We have now nished the discussion of the various concepts of isomorphisms as appro-
priate for preforms, game forms, and games - in each family with consideration of the
strategic as well as the extensive version. The next and basic concept is the one of sym-
metry. This concept applies to games only. As we have stressed in Peleg, Rosenm uller,
and Sudh olter ([6]), it does not work to consider just automorphisms of a game G, say
in strategic form, i.e., isomorphisms (;');  : N ! N; 'i : Si ! S(i) (i 2 N); such
that the game is preserved, i.e.,
(;')G = G
holds true. The reasons were explained in [6] , we refer the reader in particular to Example
3.6 of this paper. Essentially there are two objections to taking the group of automor-
phisms as to be the group of symmetries: the rst is that the only game that is preserved
under the full group of automorphisms is the constant game whereas we denitely feel
that e.g. the `Battle of Sexes', though not constant, is symmetric. The second stems
from the opposite observation: A player whose payo does not depend on his actions may
reshue his strategies arbitrarily, thus a rather substantial group of automorphisms is
generated { nevertheless there might be no obvious symmetry in view of another player's
situation.
These considerations lead to the idea of `disregarding' the `impersonal' automorphisms
which mathematically amounts to factorizing them out or forming the quotient group.
More precisely we quote the relevant denitions from [6] as follows.
Denition 1.11. A motion of a strategic game G is an automorphism (;') of G. A
motion (;') is impersonal if  is the identity (and 'i : Si ! Si(i 2 N)).
Remark 1.12. Motions form a group. To see this, dene the unit motion by? Prerequisits ? 13
(id;id) = (idN;(idSi)i2N)
and the product of motions (;') and (; ) by
(; )(;') = (;  
 ') (1.20)
where 
 is given in a natural manner via
(  
 ')i :=  (i)  'i: (1.21)
Clearly, the impersonal motions constitute a subgroup. This subgroup is normal and
therefore `disregarding' or `factorizing out' the impersonal part formally amounts to con-
structing the quotient group as to constitute the group of symmetries of the game.
The precise version is given as follows:
Denition 1.13. Let G be a strategic game. M = M(G) denotes the group of motions.
I = I(G)  M denotes the subgroup of G constituted by the impersonal motions. The
group of symmetries of G is the quotient group




A game G is symmetric if its symmetry group is isomorphic to the full group of permu-
tations of N called (N), i.e., if
S(G)  = (N) (1.23)
holds true.
The reader is referred to Example 3.15 of [6] in order to sharpen his intuition regarding
symmetries and to appreciate or debate our notion of symmetry. We nish this section
by adding the completely analogous denitions for extensive games. Clearly, the group
of automorphisms of an extensive game is a much more involved and less easier to view
object compared to its strategic counterpart. Nevertheless, the formal denitions are
based on the same type of arguments.
Denition 1.14. Let   = (;) be an extensive game. A motion (;) of   is an
automorphism of   and M = M( ) denotes the group of motions. I = I( ) is the normal
subgroup of impersonal motions, i.e., automorphisms of shape (id;): The group of
symmetries is the quotient group




and   is symmetric if S( )  = (N) holds true.
Thus far we have rehearsed the contents of the rst part of our venture, i.e., [6]. We
now turn to the more involved task of lying the foundations of representation theory.
Eventually we shall construct to every strategic game a uniquely dened extensive game
`representing' it and admitting for exactly the same group of symmetries. This is the task
described in the following sections.14 ? Section 2 ?
2 Faithful Representations
Roughly speaking, a representation of a strategic object (a preform, a game form, or a
game) is an extensive object which yields the same von Neumann-Morgenstern strategic
version as the one we startet out with. However, `the same' is not well dened, as
there is no canonical ordering of the strategies when one constructs the von Neumann-
Morgenstern strategic version. This notion has to be made precise. We then continue
to introduce faithful representations, that is, representations that preserve the group of
symmetries.
Let  be an extensive preform. A pure strategy of player i is a mapping that selects a
choice at each information set of player i. If we dene for i 2 N
~ Si := fi j i is a pure strategy of player ig (2.1)
then we obtain a strategic preform (the von Neumann-Morgenstern strategic preform)
N() = (N; ~ S) = (N;(~ Si)i2N) (2.2)
Next, if  : @E ! I R
N is a vector of utility functions, then to any  2 ~ S there is a
corresponding random variable X choosing plays in accordance with the distribution
induced by  and p. We may dene the payo at each realization of X to be the one at
the endpoint, thus the expectation
~ ui() = Ei(X
) (2.3)
is well dened. This generates a strategic game
N(;) = N( ) := (N; ~ S; ~ u) = (N(); ~ u(;)) (2.4)
which is the `von Neumann-Morgenstern' (`vNM') strategic game of  .
Denition 2.1. N() as dened by 2.1 and 2.2 is called the vNM strategic preform of ;
N( ) as dened by 2.2 and 2.4 is the vNM strategic game of  : (The term normal form
of an extensive game is common in the literature. This we shall not employ in our present
context, because the term `form' in our context is used for a particular type of structure
(strategic and extensive game forms and preforms)).
Our next purpose is to dene the relation between isomorphisms of extensive forms and
strategies. To this end, the reader should review Denition 1.7. In this context, when we
are given the partitions P;Q;C of a game tree (a game form, a game), we would like to
refer to the player dependent elements only. Thus we introduce the following notations.
We write
P 0 := P   fP0g;Q 0 := Q   Q0 where Q0 := fQ 2 QjQ  P0g: (2.5)? Faithful Representations ? 15
Now, if (;) is an isomorphism between our game tree and some other game tree with
partitions P0;Q0;C0; then we want to consider the induced mappings given by
P : P 0  ! P0
 0; Q : Q 0  ! Q0
 0;
where P(P) = P 0, whenever P =  1(P 0);
and Q(Q) = Q0, whenever Q =  1(Q0):
(2.6)
Note that both mappings are well dened and bijective, because  is bijective and respects
the partitions. Also note that

C(Q) : C(Q)  ! C
0(Q
0) (2.7)
can be dened analogously to P.
The in
uence of isomorphism on strategies is then explained as follows.
Remark 2.2. Note that an isomorphism (;) between extensive preforms  and 0 in-
duces an isomorphism between the corresponding vNM preforms. Intuitively, a strategy
of a player may be thought of as a set of `arrows' indicating actions of this player at his
information sets. Clearly, reshuing the nodes and the players in the extensive preform
also rearranges the arrows. More precisely, there exists a mapping  which to any (;)
assigns a (;'), where ' is dened by
('i())(
Q(Q)) = 
C(Q)((Q)) (Q 2 Q;Q  Pi;i 2 N; 2 ~ Si): (2.8)
For the particular case that  equals 0, the mapping  can be seen to respect compositions
of isomorphisms, i.e.,
(  ;  ) = (  ;  
 ') = (;)(;)
for automorphisms (;);(;) of ; where (;) = (; ) and (;) = (;'):
Let   and  0 be games and consider an isomorphism (;) between them. Then, of course,
(;) is an isomorphism between the underlying extensive preforms, hence (;) is an
isomorphism between the resulting vNM strategic preforms. Now we have
Lemma 2.3. Let (;) be an isomorphism between the extensive games   = (;) and
 0 = (0;0). Then (;) is an isomorphism between N( ) and N( 0).
Proof: The proof is rather straightforward as all mappings involved are bijective. In view
of this fact we restrict ourselves to a mere sketch. The probability at each chance move
of  is fully transported to the corresponding probability at the image node in 0, which
is also a chance move. Therefore the expectations of payos are preserved. q.e.d.
With game forms the situation is more involved. On the other hand here is the clue to
the decisive role game forms play in our treatment of symmetries. Therefore we have to16 ? Section 2 ?
start with the following denition which emphazises the importance of the game form
with respect to all games it may induce. To this purpose, we introduce a set of outcomes
A and utilities U : A ! I R
N. Recall Remark 1.5 concerning composition of a game form
g or 
 and U to obtain a game U  g or U  
:
Denition 2.4.
(1) Let g = (e;A;h) and 
 = (;A;) be game forms (with identical N and A). Then 

is called a representation of g if there is a family of bijections   = ( i)i2N ,  i :
Si ! ~ Si such that for every U : A ! I R
N (id; ) is an (impersonal) isomorphism
between U  g and N(U  
).
(2) A representation 
 of g is said to be faithful if for every U : A ! I R
N the symmetry
groups coincide, i.e., if
S(U  g)  = S(U  
) (U : A ! I R
N): (2.9)
Our rst observation is that representations can only occur if the extensive game form
is of a nature which avoids the introduction of `lotteries' for the computation of out-
comes resulting from strategies. To this end, for any pure strategy 0 of chance and





T ). The outcome induced is (X
0;
T ). However, it turns out that, given a
representation, the outcome does not depend on 0. More precisely, we have
Theorem 2.5. Let 
 be a representation of g. Then for all  2 ~ S the outcome (X
0;
T )
does not depend on 0.
Proof: Let (id; ) be the isomorphism mentioned in Denition 2.4. Let a 2 A. Let s 2 S
be such that the outcome (in g) is a and let  be the image under  id of s, i.e.
 2  
id(h
 1(fag)):
We want to show that (X
0;
T ) = a for all pure strategies 0 of chance. To this purpose
dene U : A ! I RN by Ui(a) = 1 (i 2 N) and Ui(b) = 0 (i 2 N;b 2 A;b 6= a). Consider
the games   = U  
 and G = U  g which is impersonally isomorphic to N(U  
). The
rst game possesses only payos 0 and 1 and so does the latter one. Hence it follows that
E(Ui  )(X) = 1 (i 2 N) (cf. 2.3). But this necessarily implies that all plays X0;
yield a payo 1. q.e.d.
Corollary 2.6. Let 
 be a representation of g. If g is general, then the impersonal
isomorphism (id; ) given by Denition 2.4 is uniquely dened.
Proof: To see this observe that `mixing' (taking expectations) can be avoided in com-
puting the outcomes resulting from strategy proles in the framework of 
. Hence an
outcome can be associated to any entry of g. As g is general this association denes a
unique mapping. q.e.d.17
The same consideration motivates the introduction of a vNM strategic game form of
an extensive game form g, even if g does not happen to be general. For, the above
mentioned association can be performed in any case, hence the following denition is
noncontradictory.
Denition 2.7. Let 
 = (;A;) be an extensive game form.
(1) If, for every  2 ~ S; the expression
(X
0;
T ) =: h
() (2.10)
is a constant independently of the pure strategy 0 of chance, then 
 is nonmixing.
(2) If 




is the vNM strategic game form of 
.
Intuitively within the framework of a nonmixing extensive game form taking lotteries (or
expectations for that matter) is avoided. Every play which chance can generate yields the
outcome determined by the strategy prole of the players.
Remark 2.8. Let 




 is a representation of some strategic game form g.
Every representation of a strategic game form is by Theorem 2.5 nonmixing. Conversely,
if 
 is nonmixing, then it is straightforward to verify that it represents N(
).
Corollary 2.9. Let 
 be a nonmixing extensive game form and g be a strategic game
form.
(1) 
 represents g, if and only if there is an impersonal outcome preserving (IOP)
isomorphism (id; ;id) between g and N(
).
(2) If g is general and 
 represents g, then the IOP isomorphism mentioned above is
uniquely determined.
3 Square General Game Forms
Our next task is to exhibit faithful representations. This will be done in the context
of game forms that, in principle, allow for symmetries, i.e., game forms with an equal
number of strategies for each player. Since for two persons the strategic versions of such
game forms resemble square matrices, we call such versions square as well. The following
denition provides a formal approach.18 ? Section 3 ?
Denition 3.1. A strategic preform e, game form (e;A;h), or game (e;u) respectively is
called square, if we have r(e) = r = jSij (i 2 N):
Lemma 3.2. Let 
 = (;A;) be a nonmixing extensive game form and let U : A ! I RN
be a utility prole. Also, let (;) be an automorphism of . Then (;) 2 M(U  
) if
and only if (;) 2 M(U  N(
)).
The proof is easy and shall be omitted.
Remark 3.3. The situation is essentially the same if the vNM game form N(
) is re-
placed by a strategic game form g of which 
 is a representation; however we have to
observe the IOP isomorphism (id; ;id) (cf. Corollary 2.9). Indeed, for xed 
 and g; 
induces a mapping  = ;e which carries automorphisms of  into automorphisms of e
via
(;) = (; 
 1 
 ' 
  ), where (;) = (;'): (3.11)
Theorem 3.4. Let 
 be a faithful representation of the square general strategic game
form g and let U : A ! I RN be a utility prole. Then
 : M(U  
)  ! M(U  g) (3.12)
is surjective.
Proof: For r = r(e) = 1 the assertion is obvious, thus we assume r  2:
1st Step: Let 
 = (;A;) and g = (N;S;A;h) be game forms with the desired prop-
erties. We can assume without loss of generality that Si = Sj = f1;:::;rg (i;j 2 N =
f1;:::;ng) holds true. Indeed, we are going to show that
 : Aut()  ! Aut(e) (3.13)
(here Aut denotes the group of automorphisms) is surjective. On rst sight this might
seem to be a more comprehensive statement, however in view of our subsequent proof
it will become clear that every automorphism can occur as a motion of a suitable game;
hence both claims are in fact equivalent.
2nd Step: First of all consider a utility prole U : A ! I Rn specied as follows. We take
Ui(s) = i  r + si (i  3;s 2 S)
in order to avoid any symmetries between players i;j  3. Furthermore put
U1(s) = U1(s1;s2) and U2(s) = U2(s1;s2)
(meaning that U1;U2 depend on the rst two coordinates only). In addition U1;U2 is
specied by




0; if s1 2 f1;2g and s2  3



















for (;) 2 f1;2g  f1;2g:
Now we are going to discuss the group of motions corresponding to U g. To this end, let
 = (1;2) be the transposition of the rst two players. Also let ij : Si ! Sj be dened





















where idn 2 is self-explaining.
As 
 is faithful, there exists  such that (;) 2 M(U 
) and  throws (;) on either
c or c3. As the group is cyclic, the powers of (;) are thrown onto all of M(U  g).


















(using the convention established in the 2nd Step). Here the group of motions can easily
be computed as






Again using faithfulness it is at once established that d necessarily has to be the image of
some (;) 2 M(U  
) under :
4th Step: Now c0;c;c2;c3; and d occured as motions in a suitable context but, of course,
they are automorphisms of e as well. We may generate similar automorphisms as images
under  by exchanging any two strategies of players 1 and 2 or, for that matter, of any
two players. The reader has now to convince himself that the family of automorphisms
created this way generates the full group of automorphisms of e: q.e.d.
The following example shows that Theorem 3.4 is false if the square game form is not
general. Moreover, it turns out in the next section that `square' cannot be dropped as a
condition.
Example 3.5. (1) Let g = (e;A;h) be the square nongeneral strategic 3-person game
form given by S1 = fu; dg; S2 = ft; bg; S3 = fl; rg; and A = fag: Then g can be20 ? Section 3 ?
Figure 3.1: A faithful representation of a nongeneral form
represented by the extensive game form 
 = (;A;) as indicated in Fig. 3.1. Note
that for every  2 (N) there is a unique  such that (;) 2 Aut(): Indeed, 
uniquely determines (i) (i 2 N) and thus : Hence jAut()j = 6: Let U : A ! I R
be a utility prole. In order to show that 
 is faithful it is sucient to distinguish 3
cases.
(a) If Ui(a) (i 2 N) are pairwise distinct, then the symmetry groups of U  

and U g consist of the identity permutation only. However, U g possesses 8
motions, whereas the identity mapping is the unique motion of U  
:
(b) If Ui(a) = Uj(a) 6= Uk(a); where fi;j;kg = N; let us say i = 1; j = 2; and
k = 3; then
S(U  
)  = S(U  
)  = f;idg;
(Here  denotes the transposition of players 1 and 2:) whereas jM(U g)j = 16
and jM(U  
)j = 2:
(c) If U1(a) = U2(a) = U3(a); then
S(U  g)  = (N)  = S(U  
);
whereas jM(U  g)j = 48 and jM(U  
)j = 6:? Square General Game Forms ? 21
This example shows that the mapping  : M(U  
) ! M(U  g) is not necessarily
surjective, if g is not general. In the present case  is injective.
(2) The situation described in the preceding example cannot occur, if the strategic game
is general. Indeed, if the strategic game form g is `the' corresponding general game
form represented by the extensive game form 
 sketched in Fig. 3.2, then a utility
Figure 3.2: A nonfaithful representation of a general form
prole used in the 3rd step of the preceding proof shows that 
 is not faithful. (Note
that the utility proles dened in the 2nd step do not yield a contradiction.)
For a strategic general game form g = (e;A;h) every automorphism (;') of e induces an
automorphism (;';h  '  h 1) of g. Analogously, for any nonmixing extensive game
form 
 = (;A;) every automorphism (;) of  induces an automorphism (;;) of 
;
where  is essentially given by     1; meaning that (a) = (()) for all  2  1(a)
is welldened independently of  (a 2 A): This fact and the last proof enables us to
reformulate Theorem 3.4.
Corollary 3.6. Let 
 = (;A;) be a representation of the general square strategic game
form g = (e;A;h) and let
~  : Aut(
) ! Aut(g)22 ? Section 3 ?
be dened by
~ (;;) = (
;e(;);) ((;;) 2 Aut(
)):
Then 
 is a faithful representation of g, if and only if ~  is surjective.
Indeed, note that ~ (;;) is an automorphism, because  = h  '  h 1; where
;e(;) = (;'); is satised.
The above development suggests to brie
y consider automorphisms of extensive preforms
that leave the corresponding vNM preforms untouched. This kind of automorphisms is
described by the following denition.
Denition 3.7. An automorphism (;0) of an extensive preform  is said to be chance
related if the following holds true:
(1)  = id
(2) 
Q
0 (Q) = Q (Q 2 Q 0) (cf. Denition 1.7 )
(3) 
C(Q)
0 (C) = C (C 2 C(Q);Q 2 Q 0)
A motion (;0) of a game   is chance related if conditions (1), (2), and (3) are satis-
ed. C( ) denotes the subgroup of chance related motions of M( ). Note that formula 2.8
of Remark 2.2 implies that (;0) is the identity, i.e., the strategies of the corresponding
vNM preform are not disturbed.
Theorem 3.8. The chance related automorphisms of an extensive preform constitute a
normal subgroup and, for every extensive game  ; the subgroup C( )  I( ) is normal.
Proof: We have to show that for any automorphism (;) and any chance related auto-





holds true. To this end it suces to show that

0
0 =  0 
 1










and analogously for (3) of Denition 3.7 q.e.d.23
Theorem 3.9. Let 
 be a faithful representation of the square general strategic game
form g. Then, for any utility prole U : A ! I RN it follows that
M(U ? 
)=C(U ? 
)  = M(U ? g) (3.18)
holds true.
Proof: Theorem 3.4 implies that  is a surjective mapping which respects composition
(Remark 2.2). It suces to show that C(U ? 
) is the kernel of this mapping.
Clearly, if (;) 2 C, then (;) = (id;id): On the other hand if (;) = (id;id), then
 has to satisfy conditions (2) and (3) of Denition 3.7, for otherwise we can construct a
strategy i 2 ~ Si that suers under the in
uence of  as dened in (4.5). q.e.d
4 Atoms
Our previous results provide us with a possibility to discuss `square games' as a rst
attempt to introduce the symmetric canonical extensive version. In order to approach
this program we shall rst of all discuss the simplest (and `nonsymmetric') version of a
representation: an atom.
Denition 4.1.
(1) A game tree is atomic, if there are no chance moves and the player partition coin-
cides with the information partition. In this case we write (E;;P;C). In particu-
lar an atomic game tree is said to be square if jC()j = jC(0)j = r for ;0 2 E @E
holds true.
(2) A preform  = (N;E;;P;C;) is atomic, if (E;;P;C) is an atomic game tree.
(3) An extensive game form  = (;A;) is an atom, if  is an atomic preform and
 : @E ! A is bijective.
(4) An atom  and its preform and game tree is time structured if every nonvoid level
L(E;;t) coincides with one player set P 2 P. In this case  is called T-atom.
Remark 4.2. Let  = (N;E;;P;C;) be a preform of an atom and let e = (N;S) be a
strategic preform of a square game form such that jSij = j~ Sij (i 2 N) is satised, where
N() = (N; ~ S). Moreover, let (id; ) be an isomorphism between e and N() (which exists
because the corresponding strategy sets have coinciding sizes).
(1) If h : S ! A is a bijection, then there exists a unique (bijective) mapping  : @E ! A
such that (id; ;id) is an IOP isomorphism between g = (e;A;h) (a general strategic
game form) and N() (where  = (;A;)); i.e.  is a representation of g. An atom
which represents g is said to be an atom of g:24 ? Section 4 ?
(2) If  : @E ! A is a bijection, then there exists a unique (bijective) mapping h : S !
A such that (id; ;id) is an isomorphism between g = (e;A;h) and N() (where
 = (;A;)); i.e. the atom  is a representation of the general game form g.
Example 4.3.









There are two atoms as indicated by Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Atoms for a (2;2  2) game
Figure 4.4: Atomic preforms for a (3;2  2  2) game
(2) For 3 persons and r = jSij = 2 for all i, consider the preforms in Figure 4.4 which
may be augmented to game forms representing appropriate strategic forms.
The T-atom is `time structured'. Assuming that the game is `Common Knowledge',
player i is aware that he moves `at instant i'. The S atom seems to exhibit some
symmetry between players 2 and 3.? Atoms ? 25
Figure 4.5: Atomic preforms for a (4;2  2  2  2) game
(3) For 4 persons and r = 2, examples of atoms can be seen in Figure 4.5.
Remark 4.4.
(1) Figure 4.5 suggests that the underlying tree (E;) of an atom  of a square gen-
eral game form g = (N;S;A;h) is essentially (i.e. up to order respecting bijective
mappings, cf. Section 1) uniquely determined. Clearly, the pair (E;) is a tree of
a square atom  = (E;;P;C;;A;) of N() which is general (in the sense of
Denition 1.3) i the maximal rank coincides with the number jNj of players and
at every node  2 E   @E there are exactly r = jSij alternatives.
(2) Also,  is an atom of g if and only if it represents g and its total rank is minimal.26 ? Section 5 ?
(3) In addition note that to any square atom  we can at once construct isomorphic
ones by permuting the players and renaming the outcomes accordingly. E.g., there
are at once 4! dierent but isomorphic atoms corresponding to each one suggested
by Figure 4.5; all of them being obtained by permuting the players arbitrarily and
renaming the outcomes accordingly.
(4) An atom of a general square game form g cannot be a faithful representation of g,
because there is no automorphism of the preform which replaces the `owner of the
root' by any other player.
5 Symmetrizations
In order to obtain faithful representations of square general game forms, we will now
construct `symmetrizations' of square atoms. To this end we shall shortly describe a
further operation acting on game trees called restriction.
A game tree (E;;P;Q;C;p) is a restriction of the game tree (E;;P;Q;C;p)
(the restriction to (E;)); if
(1) (E;) is a subtree of (E;) (i.e., E  E; :=jE:= \(E  E); @E 
@E);
(2) P := fP \ E j P 2 Pg; Q := fQ \ E j Q 2 Qg;
(3) C(Q \ E) := fS \ E j S 2 C(Q)g (Q 2 Q);
(4) C()  E and p = p ( 2 P 
0) (i.e., a chance move together with its choices and
probability distribution is either completely preserved or disappears). Note that a
possible generalization of this notion (the probabilities p should be the conditional
probabilities given E) is not needed in our present approach.
Restrictions of extensive game forms and games are dened in an obvious way. Also,
for the strategic versions the denition of a restriction is the straightforward one, e.g. a
strategic preform (N;S) is a restriction of (N;S); if S  S holds true.
Denition 5.1. Let  be a square atom. A game form 
 = (N;E;;P;C;p;;A;) (i.e.
P = Q) is a symmetrization of , if the following conditions are satised.
(1) 
 is nonmixing.
(2) The root x0 of 
 is the only chance move and px0 is uniform distribution, i.e., every
edge at x0 has the same probability.
(3) For every  2 C(x0) the restricted game form 
 := (N;E;,P;C;;A;) of

 obtained by restricting 
 to the subtree with root  generated by the edge (x0;) is
isomorphic to :? Symmetrizations ? 27
(4) For every atom  which represents N() and is isomorphic to  there exists a unique
 2 C(x0) such that  is IOP isomorphic to 
.
Example 5.2. Consider the case of two persons each of them having two strategies. Two









have been indicated in Figure 4.3. Clearly, they are isomorphic. A symmetrization is
indicated as follows.
Figure 5.6: The symmetrization
Thus for the simple (2;2  2)-case, the symmetrization described in Figure 5.6 suggests
the structure of the `canonical' representation we have in mind.
Already for 3 persons, this is not so obvious. As Figure 4.4 suggests, there are essentially
2 nonisomorphic atoms: the `time structured' or `T-atom' and the `S-atom' which seems
to exhibit more symmetry with respect to the players not called upon in the rst move,
i.e., players 2 and 3 in 4.4.
Both allow for symmetrizations and at this stage it is not clear which of them will be a
candidate for the canonical version.
Example 5.3. Figure 5.7 shows a symmetrization of the T-atom in Figure 4.4, that could
be called TSYM3
222: Figure 5.8 is the analogous version with respect to the S-atom of
Figure 4.4. At this state of aairs it may become conceivable that there is a problem arising
from the question as to which version of an extensive game represents the (3;2  2  2)
case `appropriately' in view of symmetry considerations.
The next result shows that symmetrizations exist and are faithful.
Theorem 5.4. Let  be a square atom. Then
(1)  possesses a symmetrization,28 ? Section 5 ?
Figure 5.7: The symmetrization of a T-atom (TSYM3
222)
(2) every two symmetrizations of  are IOP isomorphic,
(3) a symmetrization of  is a faithful representation of every strategic game form g
represented by .
The proof is decomposed according to the three items claimed.
Proof of item (1): Let  = (N;E;;P;C;;A;) and N() = g. Furthermore, dene
B = f j  is an atom of g isomorphic to  with tree (E;)g:
Every atom of g which is isomorphic to  is isomorphic to some atom of the nite set
B: Choose a maximal subset A  B of atoms which are not IOP isomorphic. Indeed,
B can be partitioned into the equivalence classes of IOP isomorphic atoms. The set
A contains precisely one representative of each equivalence class. Moreover, for every
 = (N;E;;P;C;;A;) 2 A take an IOP isomorphism (id; ;id) between g and? Symmetrizations ? 29
Figure 5.8: The symmetrization of an `S-atom'
N(): In view of Corollary 2.9   exists. The extensive game form

 = (N;  E;  ;  P;  C;p; ;A;  )
is dened as follows.
(1)  E = f0g [ (E  A);
(2) 0 (x0;);p0(x0;) = jAj 1 ( 2 A), where x0 is the root of (E;),
(3) (;) (0;0); i  = 0 and   0 (;0 2 A;;0 2 E):




i  ;  P0 = f0g (i 2 N);
(5)  C(  Pi) = f
S
2A( ;i(si);)jsi 2 Sig (i 2 N);
(6)  (;) = () ( 2 @E; 2 A):30 ? Section 5 ?
By construction 
 is a symmetrization of :
Proof of item (2): Let 
 and  be two symmetrizations of . By Denition 5.1
(3) there is a bijection between the atoms in 
 and  which maps every atom in 
 to an
IOP isomorphic atom in : These IOP isomorphisms together induce an IOP isomorphism
between 
 and  in a straightforward manner.
Proof of item (3): Let 
 be a symmetrization of  which represents g. The extensive
game form 
 represents g, because 
 is nonmixing and every atom in 
 represents g. Let
 = (;A;), where  = (N;E;;P;C;); be an atom of g = (N;S;A;h) = (e;A;h) such
that  is isomorphic to . Assume without loss of generality that Si = f1;:::;rg (i 2
N) holds true. Moreover, let (;') be an automorphism of e and (id; ;id) the IOP
isomorphism between g and N(): Then ; dened by  = h  '  h 1; generates an
automorphism (;';) of g: Dene 0 = (N;E;;P0;C0;0;A;0) and  : E ! E as
follows.
(1) Dene (x0) = x0 and assume that () 2 L(E;;t) ( 2 L(E;;t)) is already
dened for some 0 < T  n = jNj and 0  t < T. If  2 L(E;;T), let us say
 2 C(0) and 0 2 Pi for some i 2 N; then take the unique strategy si 2 Si such
that 0 2  i(si) and determine  2 C((0)) which satises  2  k('(si)); where
(0) 2 Pk: Dene () =  and observe that  is bijective and respects (;):
(2) Put P 0
(i) = (Pi) (i 2 N):
(3) Put C0(P 0
(i)) = (C(Pi)) (i 2 N):
(4) Put 0() = (     1)() ( 2 @E), observe that (;;) is an isomorphism
between  and 0, and that 0 represents g. Indeed, with  0
i(si) = f j(si)jPj \P 0
i 6=
;g \ C(P 0
i) (i 2 N;si 2 Si) the triple (id; 0;id) is an IOP isomorphism between g
and N(0):
This procedure applied to every restricted game 
 (where  is a successor of the root of

) yields an automorphism (; ~ ;) of 
 (note that 0 is, up to an IOP isomorphism, a
restricted game of 
). Clearly (; ~ ) = (;') (cf. Remark 3.3 for the denition of ),
thus the proof is nished. q.e.d.
Remark 5.5. It should be noted that the cardinality of the set A as dened in the proof
of item (1) varies according to the shape of the atom involved. Most conspicuously the
T-atom requires fewer isomorphic copies than a more complex version as explained by the
following sketches (and proved later on).
Figure 5.9 shows 3 copies of non-IOP isomorphic atoms, each of them from a dierent
equivalence class of B as mentioned in item (1). Each of these atoms admits of 3! = 6
further isomorphic atoms which are obtained by permuting the players. Of course all of
these again stem from dierent equivalence classes, because permuting players forbids IOP
isomorphism. Hence there are alltogether 18 non-IOP isomorphic atoms which, similarly
as indicated in Figure 5.7, are then glued together in order to generate the symmetrization.? Symmetrizations ? 31
Figure 5.9: Non-IOP isomorphic atoms
By contrast, the T-atom for the same general 333 strategic game form, as represented
by Figure 5.10, generates a symmetrization which is obtained by glueing together only the
6 non-IOP isomorphic copies obtained by permuting the players.
Figure 5.10: The 3  3  3 T-atom
Corollary 5.6. Let 
 be a symmetrization of some square atom which represents g: Then
every restriction of 
 which faithfully represents g coincides with 
:
Proof: To verify this assertion a part of the proof of item (3) has to be repeated. Clearly
at least one of the atoms in 
, say ; has to occur in the faithful restriction (otherwise the
restriction is not a representation of g): Moreover, for another atom 0 which occurs in32 ? Section 5 ?

 there is an isomorphism (;) between both atoms. Applying  and the IOP isomor-
phisms between the normalizations of the atoms and g yields an automorphism (;';)
of g. In view of the proof of Theorem 3.4 there must be an automorphism of 
 which is
mapped to this automorphism of g. Denition 5.1 (3) completes the proof. q.e.d.
Dierent atoms of a square general game form possess isomorphic trees (e.g., the number of
nodes coincides). This is no longer true for `the' symmetrizations as shown in Remark 5.5,
i.e. symmetrizations of dierent atoms of a square general game form may have dierent
numbers of plays and, thus, endpoints. Hence the total ranks may dier. Nevertheless
the following result holds true.
Theorem 5.7. Let g = (e;A;h) be a general square strategic game form and let 
 be a
faithful representation of g with minimal total rank. Then 
 is the symmetrization of an
atom of g: Moreover, the symmetrization of a T-atom of g possesses minimal total rank.
Proof:
1st Step: Let r := jSij (i 2 N). First of all consider the case that 
 is the symmetrization
of a T-atom of g: Clearly 
 possesses exactly n! (where n = jNj) atoms. Now all plays
have the same length (i.e. rank of the endpoint) which is n + 1: In each of the n! atoms
there are rn such paths. Hence the total rank of any of these atoms is rnn: With respect
to 
, the corresponding rank originating from each atom is rn(n + 1), because there is
an additional edge joining the atom to the root of 
: There are n! atoms, hence the total
rank of the graph (E;) of 
 is rn(n + 1)n! = rn(n + 1)!.
2nd Step: Next, we are going to show that a representation which is faithful has total
rank which is at least rn(n+1)!. To this end let 
 be a faithful representation of g which has
minimal total rank. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that N(
) = g hols true.
For every s 2 S and every  2 (N) choose '(;s) = ' and (;s) =  such that (;';)
is an automorphism of g and '(s) = s is satised. Let ~  be dened as in Corollary 3.6.
Let  = (;s) be an automorphism of the game tree of 
 such that (;;) is in the
inverse image of (;';), i.e., ~ (;;) = (;';): The existence of  is guaranteed by
faithfulness. Fix a pure strategy 0 of chance and let X0;s = (x0;xs
1;:::;xs
T(s)) be the
play generated by (0;s): For every permutation  the outcome ((;s)(xs
T(s))) coincides
with h(s); because '(;s) keeps the strategy prole s: Dierent strategy proles lead
to dierent outcomes, because g is assumed to be general. Counting the number of
strategy proles and the number of permutations yields rnn! dierent plays with endpoints
(;s)(xs
T(s)):
The length T(s) of every play is at least n+1; because every play intersects an information
set of every player and of chance. Indeed, if a player is not involved, then a `row' of g does
not depend on the player's strategy (which is impossible, because g is general). Moreover,
the root of 
 cannot belong to the information set of some player.
3rd Step: The total rank of (E;) is therefore at least n!rn(n+1) (recall that the length
of each play is at least n+1 due to the 2nd step). By minimality of the total rank and the
1st step it follows that the total rank is exactly equal to this number and the root is the
only chance move. Hence the restriction of 
 to every subtree generated by a successor of
the root is an atom and Theorem 3.4 completes the proof. q.e.d.? Symmetrizations ? 33
The `minimal total rank property' will be crucial in the next section. Of course there
are many faithful representations of a general square game form; one is presented in the
following example.
Figure 5.11: A faithful representation with multiple chance moves
Example 5.8. A faithful representation 
g of a general square game form g = (N;S;A;h)
can be constructed recursively on the number n of players. For n = 2 `the' symmetrization
of its atom (see Figure 5.6) is taken. For n  3 the faithful representation is constructed
as follows. The root x0 is constructed to be a chance move. It possesses n successors i
belonging to the dierent player sets and px0 is uniform distribution. There is a bijection
from the set of successors i of i to player i's strategy set Si (let us say i 7! si): The
restriction to the subtree generated by i is the faithful representation 
gsi of the n   1
person reduced strategic game form gsi = (N n fig;j6=iSj;A;hsi); dened by
h
si((sj)j6=i) = h(si;(sj)j6=i):
Of course every player has only one information set. The straightforward proof of faith-
fulness is left to the reader. Figure 5.11, which sketches the 2  2  2 case, should be
compared with Figures 5.7 and 5.8.34 ? Section 6 ?
6 The Canonical Representation
Within the previous section we have characterized the symmetrizations of square atoms
as the only representations of square strategic games that respect the symmetries and
satisfy a minimality condition. Apart from the fact that the result holds true only in the
case that all players have the same number of strategies, the assignment of an extensive
game form to a given strategic game form is not unique. For the class of square atoms
(and their symmetrizations) is still remarkably large: compare e.g. Figure 4.5; here we
see various nonisomorphic atoms that are capable of representing a 2  2  2  2-game.
The nal task is, therefore, to introduce symmetrizations of time structured atoms that
yield representations in the case of game forms that are not necessarily square. In addition
we show that this construction admits of an axiomatically dened unique mapping, the
`canonical' representation.
Denition 6.1. Let  be a T-atom. An extensive game form 
 = (N;E;;P;C;p;;A;)
is a symmetrization of , if the following conditions are satised.
(1) 
 is nonmixing.
(2) The root x0 of 
 is the only chance move and px0 is uniform distribution, i.e., every
edge at x0 has the same probability.
(3) For every  2 C(x0) the restricted game form 
 is a T-atom.
(4) For every T-atom  which represents N() there is a unique  2 C(x0) such that 
is IOP isomorphic to 
:
Note that the (unique up to IOP isomorphisms) symmetrization of a T-atom  has n!
branches at the root corresponding to as many T-atoms, which all belong to the vNM
strategic game form N():
Generally we will have to accept that a representation can only be dened up to outcome
preserving impersonal isomorphisms. On the other hand the variety oered by all atoms
is too large. Moreover, we should additionally have faithful representations of nonsquare
game forms.
Clearly the preservation of symmetries as formulated so far cannot help in a general
nonsquare game, for even in the case of two players there are no symmetries of a general
game at all since there are no bijective mappings of the strategy sets. However, as our
discussion in Section 0 shows, there are symmetries of restricted versions which should
be preserved. Verbally, if two strategies/actions of a player result in the same payo no
matter what his opponents choose to do, then this game is in a well dened sense reducible
and the restricted version may well have symmetries the preservation of which should be
satised by a `canonical' representation. And if we construct nongeneral game forms with
the above property, then the symmetries obtained this way may indeed be used to further
reduce the family of representations and hence result in a canonical representation.? The Canonical Representation ? 35
Thus, it will be the interplay of restriction and symmetries that characterizes the canonical
representation of a strategic game form (minimality assumed). Therefore we shall add
the notion of `consistency' (with respect to restriction) to our requirements concerning
representation.
Arbitrary restrictions however, as dened at the beginning of Section 5 cannot be admit-
ted. We shall call a restriction (E;;P;Q;C;p) of a game tree (E;;P;Q;C;p)
proper if the root is preserved. Recall that all chance moves together with their choices
(and the probabilities) are either fully preserved or completely disappear. The notion is
at once extended to game forms and games.
There is a further, more formal obstacle to be tackled before we can reach a rigorous
formulation of the `canonical' representation. This is presented by the aim to precisely
dene a mapping which represents the choice of a canonical representation. Mappings
should be dened on a nice domain - of game forms in our present context. However,
if we speak about the `set of all game forms' we might encounter unpleasant surprises
common in elementary set theory, for game forms so far are dened with arbitrary (nite)
outcome sets.
More than that, if we look closer, we made no restrictions on the underlying sets of
strategies (in a strategic form) neither concerning the elements of the underlying graph
(in an extensive form). Thus, when speaking about the set of e.g. strategic games, at the
present state of aairs, we will be forced to speak about the set of all nite sets several
times.
In order to avoid such footangels we should restrict ourselves to a xed innite set U
(the alphabet or universe of letters or outcomes) which intuitively rst of all is a list
of all possible outcomes admitted for game forms (strategic and extensive). I.e., we shall
always tacitly assume that for any game form mentioned, the outcome set satises A 
U; thus the admissible outcome sets are subsets of U.
It is no loss of generality to assume in addition that any strategy set Si mentioned as well
as the set of nodes E of a graph involved in our consideration is also a subset of U. For
the present section we set out under this additional hypothesis.
We feel that this kind of intricacies should be mentioned but not overstressed. Thus, we
x the set of general strategic game forms G and the set of extensive game forms   and
dene a mapping F : G !   always assuming that the outcomes, nodes, strategies ...
involved are given by subsets of U.
Denition 6.2. Let F : G !   be a mapping.
(1) F is called a representation (of strategic game forms) if, for any g 2 G it follows
that F(g) is a representation of g (cf. Denition 2.4 (1)).
(2) A representation F is said to be faithful if it preserves symmetries and respects
isomorphisms. More precisely, for any g 2 G, it should follow that F(g) is a faithful36 ? Section 6 ?
representation (cf. Denition 2.4 (2)) and whenever g and g0 are isomorphic, then
so are F(g) and F(g0).
(3) A faithful representation F is said to be consistent if it respects proper restriction
up to impersonal isomorphisms. More precisely, for any g 2 G and any restriction
~ g of g it is true that F(~ g) is IOP isomorphic to a proper restriction of F(g): That
is, `F and the restriction operation commute'.
(4) A faithful representation F is said to be minimal, if for every square g 2 G, the
total rank of F(g) is minimal.
(5) A faithful, consistent, and minimal representation is said to be canonical.
Remark 6.3. Given our present state of development, we are in the position to construct
a canonical representation. To this end, assign to every g 2 G the symmetrization of a
time structured atom (cf. Denition 6.1). This mapping is not uniquely dened; given
g 2 G, we may apply an impersonal and outcome preserving isomorphism to F(g) with-
out `essentially' changing the nature of the mapping thus dened. In this sense a `time
structured' representation is dened uniquely `up to impersonal outcome preserving iso-
morphisms'. It is canonical, because a symmetrization of a T-atom of a restricted game
form of a strategical game form g is a proper restriction of a symmetrization of a T-atom
of g:
Denition 6.4. The time structured canonical representation as described by Remark
6.3 is denoted by T .
Clearly our next aim is to show that T is `the' only canonical representation. As it stands
now the development in Section 5 and in particular Theorem 5.7 point to symmetrizations
of atoms but not necessarily to the time structured version. As a rst result we shall now
prove that the time structure appears necessarily for general square game forms with at
least three strategies for each player.
Theorem 6.5. Let g = (N;S;A;h) be a square general game form such that jSij = r 
3 (i 2 N). Let  be an atom of g. Then the symmetrization of  is a totally rank minimal
faithful representation of g; if and only if  is a T-atom.
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume that Si = f1;:::;rg (i 2 N) holds true.
The atom is denoted by  = (N;E;;P;C;;A;), the symmetrization is 
; we may
assume without loss of generality that  occurs as some 
 in the sense of Denition 5.1
(3).
1st Step: Now we attach labels according to strategies at all nodes of 
 except the
root and its successors. To this end observe rst that  i identies elements of Si and
of ~ Si as explained in Denition 2.4. Therefore, if player i is in command at node  and
chooses si 2 Si, this leads to a well specied successor  of  which now carries the label
si: The process of labeling constitutes a mapping from Si into the successors of nodes? The Canonical Representation ? 37
at which player i is in command. This re
ection of a strategy by labels is commom in
Game Theory and can be viewed in Figure 3.1, where the labels u;d;t;b;l;r are drawn
at the corresponding edges for more clarity. We will not formally dene the mapping but
frequently refer to it.
2nd Step: The labeling induces an identication of plays in 
 as well as of all the atoms
in 
 as follows. First of all any s 2 S corresponds to a unique play in  (just follow
the labels). Next consider the automorphism (;id) of the preform of g: Here id is the
natural family of `identities' id
i : Si ! S(i): To this automorphism there corresponds a
unique automorphism (;) of the preform of 
 (cf. Corollary 3.6).  transforms the play
in  labeled by s into some other play carrying the same label. In particular consider
 6= id and s = (1;:::;1) or s = (2;:::;2) or etc. Then the second play cannot run
through , because it leads to the same outcome as the rst one - but there is exactly one
play carrying an outcome in each atom. From this we see immediately that  carries 
bijectively to some other atom in 
; say ; and that, indeed, n! atoms can be identied
by the permutations (id corresponding to ). As the faithful representation of g by 
 is
totally rank minimal, we conclude in view of Theorem 5.7 that 
 has exactly the n! atoms
 ( 2 (N)):
3rd Step: We focus the attention on  and recall the denition of r (cf. Section 1).
For  2 E and r() < t let L(t) denote the set of nodes on level t that have  as a
common ancestor with respect to the completion of  : Call a level L(E;;t) intact, if
it is contained in some Pi (hence equals Pi) and broken otherwise. (The n th level is
broken!) We introduce
 t = minft j L(E;;t) is brokeng:
It is our nal aim to show that  t equals n: Assume, on the contrary, that  t < n holds true.
Let  be such that
(1) L( t) 6 Pi (i 2 N) and r() <  t
(2) the rank r() is maximal with respect to (1).
Then every successor of  is the common ancestor of all nodes of L( t): By maximality of
r() the set L( t) belongs to one player set. We now claim that for dierent ;0 2 C()
the corresponding L( t) and L0( t) belong to dierent player sets, hence at least r players
are in command on level  t: This claim will be conrmed in the 4th Step. Figure 6.1
indicates the procedure to be followed during the remaining steps of the proof.
4th Step: To this end let 1;2;3 2 C() be dierent successors of  (recall that r =
jSij  3). Assume without loss of generality that L1( t)  P1 and L2( t)  P2: It suces
to show that L3( t) is not contained in P1: Let L3( t) be contained in Pi: The player
who is in command at node  assigns two labels to 2 and 3 as described in the rst
step; let these labels be s2 and s3 respectively. There is an impersonal automorphism
of the preform of g which just transposes s2 and s3: To this automorphism there exists
the corresponding automorphism of the preform of 
 given by Corollary 3.6; we call it38 ? Section 6 ?
Figure 6.1: The preform of 
(id;23): In view of the fact that automorphisms transfer atoms to atoms, we can single
out an atom which is the image of  under 23: By the 2nd Step this atom is of the form
 for some  2 (N): We refer to the levels within  by subscript :
Again consider the successor 3 of : We have
L
23(3)
 ( t) = 
23L
3( t)  
23Pi = Pi; (6.1)
because 23 respects the ancestor relation and (id;23) is impersonal. On the other hand,
23(3) carries the label s2; because 3 carries the label s3 and 23 has been constructed
according to the transposition of s2 and s3: Hence L
23(3)
 ( t) has to be a subset of P(2):
From this and from formula (6.1) we conclude that (2) = i:
Next perform the same operation for the successor 2 of  in order to show that (i) = 2
holds true as well. And, if 1 is considered, it follows that (1) = 1: Clearly this shows
that i 6= 1 is true. Hence we have proved the claim raised at the end of the 3rd Step.
5th Step: Without loss of generality we assume i = 3: Player 3 appears the 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on level  t (in ); as all previous levels are intact. Therefore 1 is the ancestor of some
 2 P3 with r() >  t: Let 12 be generated by the exchange of 1 and 2 analogously to
the construction of 23 by the exchange of 2 and 3 in the 4th Step. The corresponding
atom is 12 (as  = 23 was specied above). Analogously to the 4th Step we conclude
that 12(1) = 2;12(2) = 1; and 12(3) = 3: Let s 2 S be a strategy prole which
generates a play Xs in  passing through 1 and  (use the labeling of the 2nd Step).
The automorphism (id;'12) that induces (id;12) via  throws s into some s0 and, hence,
species a play Xs0 in : On level r() we nd exactly one node 0 on Xs0: The labeling
s corresponds to (Xs0) in 12: As 12(3) = 3; the play corresponding to label s in 12
will pass through P3 on level r(); i.e. (0) 2 P3: Therefore 0 2 P3 holds as well. Note
that 0 2 L2(r()) due to the construction of s0:
6th Step: The same procedure argued with the automorphism 13 (constructed analo-
gously again) is now applied to the play Xs in : The play Xs passes through P1 rst
and reaches P3 at ; Because  is a member of Xs and 1 is an ancestor of  2 P3: We
conclude that the play Xs00 (obtained by using '13) passes the level r() at some node 00
which is an element of P1: By interchanging the r^ oles of player 1 and 2 (i.e., application
of 23 to 0 or Xs0 respectively) we have to conclude that 00 2 P2: This is a contradiction
which shows that the assumption  t < n raised in the 3rd Step cannot be true. Hence  is
time structured. q.e.d.
The main theorem can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 6.6. There is a unique (i.e. up to impersonal outcome preserving isomor-
phisms) canonical representation of strategic games (over a given universal alphabet) and
this is the time structured mapping T :
Proof:
As we have seen in Remark 6.3 the mapping T has the desired properties (of course
T again is only dened up to impersonal outcome preserving isomorphisms). Thus it
remains to show uniquenes.
To this end, let F be a representation enjoying the desired properties. Fix a strategic
game g = (N;S;A;h) 2 G. Let S =
Q
i2N S
i be such that S
i  Si yields jS
i j = r 
maxj2N jSjj (i 2 N) for some r  3 and let g = (N;S;A;h) 2 G be such that g is a
restriction of g: The existence of g 2 G is ensured by the choice of U which renders G
to be suciently large. By Theorem 6.5 it follows that F(g) =: 
 = T (g) holds true
(up to an IOP isomorphism). Let (id; ;id) be the IOP isomorphism between g and
N(T (g)): This automorphism in particular carries the subset S of strategies available
in g into the strategies available for N(T (g)); called ~ S: We now dene an extensive
game form 
 with the aid of 
 and   : All we have to do is to take all plays of 
 that
are images of strategies s 2 S under  ; i.e. all plays generated by  id(S)  ~ S: (This
amounts to taking all plays Xs in all atoms  of 
 as discussed in the proof of Theorem
6.5.)
The nodes of 
 obtained by persuing all these plays together with the obvious binary40 ? Section 6 ?
relation constitute a tree to which all further data of 
 may be restricted in the obvious
way. The time structured nature of a symmetrization which is characteristically for 

allows for an easy verication of the fact that the restriction is, indeed, proper. Call the
resulting extensive game form 
: As T respects proper restriction it follows that 
 is a
faithful representation of g: However, consistency applies as well for F, hence F(g) is IOP
isomorphic to T (g): q.e.d.
Remark 6.7. Denition 6.2 can be generalized to mappings F : H !   for any subset
H  G of general strategic game forms without changes; however H has to comply with
a few additional requirements. This is so because a set H which is too small may not
allow for suciently many games, thus the existence requirement of Denition 6.2 (3)
could be damaged. To avoid this possibility, call H hereditary, if every restriction of a
game form of H belongs to H. For a hereditary H the time structured representation T
restricted to H is clearly canonical. Uniqueness can be guaranteed (repeat the proofs of
Theorems 6.5 and 6.6) provided the following condition is satised.
For any g = (N;S;A;h) 2 H there is a square strategic game
form g = (N;S;A;h) 2 H such that g is a restriction of g:
(6.2)
The remainder of this section is devoted to an example which shows that (6.2) cannot be
dropped as a prerequisite of uniqueness.
Figure 6.2: The cross over exampleREFERENCES 41
Example 6.8. Let n  3 and H be a hereditary subset of G consisting of game forms
with strategy sets of cardinality 1 or 2: For N = f1;:::;ng and (N;S;A;h) 2 H satisfying
jSij = 2 (i 2 N); dene the atom  as follows. The nodes of E are given by f(t;l)j0 
t  n;1  l  2tg: The player sets are specied via (t;l) 2 Pt+1 (t = 0 or 3  t <
n);(1;l) 2 Pl+1;(2;l) 2 P3 (l  2) and (2;l) 2 P2 (l  3): The choices are indicated in
Figure 6.2.
Let F : H !   be the mapping that assigns the symmetrization of  to g and is arranged
consistently otherwise. This mapping is canonical. The clue is found by an inspection of
Figure 6.2 and of the proof of Theorem 6.5. As the 3rd strategy is missing, the overcrossing
of player sets P2 and P3 cannot be avoided by the construction supplied in the 5th Step.
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